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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This is an appeal brought by appellant Rameen Amirkhizi from a judgment 
and conviction on two counts of possession of a controlled substance, third 
degree felonies, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Amirkhizi entered 
pleas of guilty after the trial court denied his motion to suppress and, pursuant to 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), he reserved his right to appeal 
the denial of the motion. (R. at 61,62, 80) The appeal is brought under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(1)(a). The Utah Court of Appeals invokes appellate 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
Statement of the Issue and Standards of Review 
Issue 1. Whether the district court erred in holding that EMT Mohler's 
search of Amirkhizi's backpack was not a "private search" and was therefore not 
done in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Standard of Review. In State v. 
Ellinasworth. 966 P.2d 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this court was asked to decide 
whether conduct by employees of the Workers' Compensation Fund constituted 
state action. Although not stated explicitly, it appears that the issue was treated 
as most Fourth Amendment issues are treated: although questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness, there may be factual findings that bear on the issue. 
The appellate court will review factual determinations made by a trial court with 
1 
deference. State v. Lova. 2001 UT App. 3,1J6,18 P.3d 1116; see also State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (thoroughly analyzing standards of 
review of Fourth Amendment issues). 
Issue 2. Whether the officer who searched the backpack, against 
Amirkhizi's wishes, violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to obtain a search 
warrant. Standard of Review. This is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual 
determinations made by the district court are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with some 
discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual 
findings. State v. Lova. 2001 UT App. 3,1J6,18 P.3d 1116. 
Issue 3. Whether the district court erred in finding that the contraband 
would have been inevitably discovered because police had probable cause to 
arrest Amirkhizi based on information provided by the EMT. As with the two 
preceding issues, this is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual determinations 
made by the district court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 
Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with some discretion given to the 
application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings, id 
2 
Relevant Constitutional Provisions. Statutes, and Rules 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated,... 
Statement of the Case 
On September 18, 2002, Amirkhizi was involved in a one-car accident on 
Interstate 80 in Summit County. Police officers and an ambulance arrived on the 
scene. Amirkhizi, who was not badly injured, reluctantly agreed to be taken to the 
hospital by ambulance. A subsequent search of Amirkhizi's backpack and 
vehicle revealed narcotics and paraphernalia. 
The state charged Amirkhizi in a four-count information: Count I, 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony; Count II, 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony; 
Count III, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
(marijuana), a third degree felony; Count IV, possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor. 
After the preliminary hearing, Amirkhizi filed a motion to suppress evidence 
(R. 20-21) arguing that the EMT, who initially searched Amirkhizi's backpack, was 
a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes and that the search he conducted 
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of the backpack went well beyond the limited permission Amirkhizi had provided 
to simply place Amirkhizi's key in the backpack. Second, Amirkhizi argued that 
the search of his car by the police was not justified by the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement and was therefore illegal. 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress (R. 49-54), and Amirkhizi 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count I and Count II of the information, 
reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion. Count III and Count IV were 
dismissed as part of the plea bargain. 
Statement of Facts1 
On September 17, 2002, EMT Dexter Mohler responded to a call indicating 
there had been a one-car accident on Interstate 80. Mohler is an on-call 
employee of the Evanston (Wyoming) Fire Department and Ambulance Service, 
which is run by the county. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 2,10-11) 
[Hereinafter "T."] 
In December of 1999, Mohler received training from the Uintah County, 
Wyoming sheriffs office and the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigations 
1
 At the preliminary hearing, there was some problem with the recording 
equipment during the defense cross-examination of Trooper Brian Davis of the Utah 
Highway Patrol. Where indicated, the parties have stipulated that the facts set forth in 
this Statement of Facts accurately reflect Davis' testimony on cross-examination. 
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on drug awareness and drug recognition. Part of this training was provided by a 
"strike force" made up of local police officers. (T. at 7,17) 
At the accident scene, at mile post 196 in Summit County, Utah, Mohler 
found one patient standing next to the car with the driver's door open. The 
patient, Rameen Amirkhizi, had minor injuries and was able to walk. Reluctantly, 
Amirkhizi agreed to go the emergency room. He climbed on the gurney and was 
placed in the ambulance. (T. at 2-3, 26) 
Amirkhizi had a backpack with him and asked Mohler to get the keys from 
the car because he needed his work keys that were on the same ring. Mohler 
asked if Amirkhizi would like the keys placed in the backpack and Amirkhizi 
agreed. Mohler opened the side pocket of the backpack and saw a prescription 
pill bottle. When he opened the bottle, Mohler found a capsule and a baggie with 
powder in it. Mohler opened another pocket of the backpack and found syringes. 
(T. at 4-6) 
Amirkhizi, who already had the backpack with him, was immobilized on the 
gurney and inside the ambulance when he asked Mohler to get the keys. (T. at 
11-12) 
Mohler opened the prescription bottle because he was "curious" to see 
what was inside. At no time before or after discovering the contents of the bottle 
did Mohler ask whether Amirkhizi had taken any drugs or medication. (T. at 13-
5 
14) 
After inspecting the contents of the backpack, Mohler placed the items 
back into the backpack, zipped it shut, and informed a Deputy Chandler, who was 
already on the scene, of what he had discovered. (Stipulated Facts, R. 33-34) 
When Trooper Brian Davis of the Utah Highway Patrol arrived at the scene, 
he assumed it was nothing more than an injury accident situation. (T. at 26) 
Deputy Chandler told Trooper Davis about Amirkhizi's "known drug 
history." No specifics or details about the alleged drug history were provided to 
Trooper Davis.2 Chandler also told Davis that when Amirkhizi was being loaded 
onto the stretcher, Chandler offered to carry the backpack to the ambulance and 
Amirkhizi refused, pulling it away. (T. at 26-27; Stipulated Facts, at R. 33-34) 
Chandler then told Deputy Davis what EMT Mohler had discovered in the 
backpack. Without ever speaking to Mohler directly, Davis got in the ambulance 
to talk with Amirkhizi. Amirkhizi refused to give his consent for a search of the 
backpack. (T. at 27; Stipulated Facts, R. 34) 
Believing he had probable cause to search the backpack, Davis seized the 
backpack from Amirkhizi and found most of the items that form the basis of this 
prosecution. (T. at 27) Amirkhizi was then arrested. His car was searched with 
2
 Amirkhizi denies any criminal history involving drugs, and no information to the 
contrary has been provided to the defense in discovery. 
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a drug canine, and the dog alerted on marijuana residue. (Stipulated Facts, R. 
35) 
Trooper Davis "determined" that he did not need to obtain a search warrant 
because the "unusual circumstances" of the case, including Mohler's information 
about the contents of the backpack and Amirkhizi's refusal to give consent, 
constituted an exception to the warrant requirement. (Stipulated Facts, R. 34-35) 
Summary of the Argument 
EMT Mohler, who searched Amirkhizi's backpack at the scene of the crash, 
did not conduct the search for a legitimate non-law enforcement purpose. He 
admitted he was looking for drugs and weapons. (T. at 16-17) He testified he had 
received training in drug recognition and interdiction by Wyoming police, and had 
been encouraged by Wyoming police in those efforts. Mohler never asked 
Amirkhizi about what was contained in the backpack. Mohler's conduct 
constituted state action and his search of the backpack violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The warrantless search of the backpack by Trooper Davis was unlawful 
because even if Davis had probable cause, his justification that "unusual 
circumstances" allowed him to dispense with a warrant does not provide a proper 
basis to uphold the search. There is no exception to the warrant requirement that 
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permitted Davis to make a warrantless search of the backpack. 
Finally, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to this case. Even 
if Trooper Davis had probable cause to arrest Amirkhizi, there was no showing 
made by the state that arrest was inevitable - that it would have occurred. 
Indeed, Davis had alternative courses of action available to him, such as securing 
the backpack until a search warrant could be obtained or getting a telephonic 
warrant, that would not have required him to arrest Amirkhizi but would have 
preserved the integrity of the evidence. Davis did not testify that he was going to 
place Amirkhizi under arrest. The district court simply made that assumption in 
the absence of any evidence in the record. 
Argument 
A. EMT Mohler's search of Amirkhizi's backpack was not a "private 
search" and was done in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
As a county employee with police training in drug recognition and 
awareness, EMT Mohler's exploration of the contents of Amirkhizi's backpack 
cannot be viewed as a private search. Mohler engaged in state action for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and his warrantless search of the backpack 
violated Amirkhizi's rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
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"The decisions of [the Supreme] Court firmly establish that the Fourth 
Amendment extends beyond the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a 
law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime." 
Michigan v. Tyler. 436 U.S. 499, 504 (1978). The Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals from "arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Camara v. 
Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). In Tyler, the fire department arrived 
to put out the fire of a burning furniture store. After the fire had been 
extinguished, fire fighters returned to the store and collected items thought to be 
evidence of arson. The Court held that entry without a warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment: 
[T]here is no diminution in a person's reasonable expectation of 
privacy nor in the protection of the Fourth Amendment simply 
because the official conducting the search wears the uniform of a 
firefighter rather than a policeman, or because his purpose is to 
ascertain the cause of a fire rather than to look for evidence of a 
crime, or because the fire might have been started deliberately. 
436 U.S. at 506. 
Accordingly, in holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches 
conducted by public school officials in New Jersey v. TLO. 469 U.S. 325, 335 
(1985) (parallel citations omitted), the Supreme Court observed: 
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth Amendment 
was primarily directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary 
practice of using general warrants or "writs of assistance" to 
authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown. See 
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United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United 
States. 116 U.S. 616, 624-629 (1886). But this Court has never 
limited the Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court 
has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment's strictures as restraints 
imposed upon "governmental action"-that is, "upon the activities of 
sovereign authority." Burdeau v. McDowell. 256 U.S. 465,475 
(1921). Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable 
to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities: building 
inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523, 528 
(1967), Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, see Marshall 
v. Barlow's Inc.. 436 U.S. 307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen 
entering privately owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. 
Tyler. 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints 
imposed by the Fourth Amendment. As we observed in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, supra. "[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as 
recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials." 387 U.S., at 528. Because the individual's 
interest in privacy and personal security "suffers whether the 
government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws 
or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Marshall v. 
Barlow's. Inc.. supra. 436 U.S., at 312-313, it would be "anomalous 
to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected 
by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of 
criminal behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra. 387 U.S., at 
530. 
Utah appellate courts have had a limited opportunity to analyze state action 
questions with respect to application of the Fourth Amendment. In State v. 
Ellinasworth. 966 P.2d 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), employees of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund (WCF) provided medical records to the Utah Attorney 
General for a possible workers' compensation fraud prosecution. The WCF 
claims adjustor, whose duties included determining the compensability of claims, 
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assuring appropriate medication and treatment, and determining when a claimant 
could return to work, noted defendant's mounting bills and other problems in the 
file. Accordingly, the adjustor decided to send defendant to an independent 
physician to review her medical history. The adjustor then received defendant's 
consent to obtain her medical records, which were forwarded to the independent 
physician. The independent physician concluded that defendant's pain was not 
related to her accident. The adjustor also provided the defendant's medical 
information to the WCF's investigation department, which sent it on to the 
attorney general, Id at 1221-22. 
On appeal, the Ellinqsworth court observed that the "relevant authority 
under the Fourth Amendment focuses not on whether a state actor is involved, 
but on whether non-law enforcement government employees' acts are 'state 
action' subject to the Fourth Amendment strictures." ]a\ at 1222. The court noted 
that in prior cases the Utah Supreme Court had adopted a two-part test to make 
state action determinations with respect to private, non-government conduct. \± 
at 1224. The court in Ellingsworth held that the same test applies to non-law 
enforcement government agents, id at 1225. Accordingly, the inquiry must 
focus on (1) the government's knowledge of and acquiescence to the conduct of 
the party performing the search, and (2) the intent of the party performing the 
search. Jd at 1224. The court concluded that the WCF did not engage in state 
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action because WCF agents investigated the defendant's claims solely to 
determine if she was eligible to receive benefits, and did so without any direction 
or instruction from the attorney general. Second, with respect to the intent of the 
party conducting the search, the WCF "had a purpose completely independent of 
law enforcement," in that the agency investigated defendant's claim "for its own 
benefit and without law enforcement involvement." Jg\ at 1225. 
When a non-law enforcement government employee works hand-in-glove 
with police, and is actually trained by police in narcotics interdiction, as happened 
in the case at bar, the existence of "state action" becomes readily apparent. 
Accordingly, it has been held that the exclusionary rule should apply to police 
dispatchers because dispatchers, although not law enforcement officers, are 
clearly an "'adjunctQ to the law enforcement team engaged in the often 
competitive exercise of ferreting out crime.'" See United States v. Shareef. 100 
F.3d 1491, 1502-03 (10th Cir. 1996). 
Government conduct, rather than purely private conduct, triggers the 
protection of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases. However, government 
conduct is not limited to the acts of police officers or agencies. The policy has 
been expressed as follows: 
What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from 
governmental interference. Therefore, the right against 
unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure 
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of the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance 
with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a 
whim, for no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one 
occasion, it would be 'anomalous to say that the individual and his 
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only 
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' 
Soldal v. Cook County. III.. 113 S.Ct. 538, 548 (1992) (citations omitted). 
In United States v. Attson. 900 F.2d 1427,1433 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 
U.S. 961 (1990), the court concluded that "for the conduct of a governmental 
party to be subject to the Fourth Amendment, the governmental party engaging in 
that conduct must have acted with the intent to assist the government in its 
investigatory or administrative purposes and not for an independent purpose." 
Applying the forgoing to the search by EMT Mohler, after finding the 
prescription bottle in the pocket where he deposited the keys, Mohler decided to 
open another pocket because he was concerned about other problems, such as 
whether the backpack contained any weapons or other drugs. (T. 16-17) Of 
course the presence of weapons had nothing to do with Amirkhizi's medical 
condition. The only logical inference from Mohler's testimony on this point is that 
his weapons inquiry was directly related to a criminal drug investigation. Mohler 
also explained that as an EMT he had been involved in other criminal cases 
where he head provided evidence to the police and that the police had 
encouraged him to continue in that capacity. (T. 18) Mohler's intent at this point 
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is clearly directed toward a law enforcement goal. In the second pocket Mohler 
discovered a syringe. (T. 6) He then zipped up the backpack, with the items he 
had found still inside. Mohler next talked to the nurse who was part of the 
ambulance team. Mohler told the nurse that he had "found some syringes in the 
pack as well as some other things." This information was provided, according to 
Mohler, in order to give the nurse "a heads up to be a little more cautious with the 
patient and maybe give him a line of questioning to talk to the patient about what 
was in the pack." (T. 6) The record contains only these vague statements about 
the information transmitted by Mohler to the nurse. It is impossible from this 
testimony to conclude that Mohler's intent was to provide information relating to 
Amirkhizi's treatment. Mohler apparently did not tell the nurse he had found both 
prescription drugs and what he suspected was cocaine. There is no indication 
from the record that Mohler informed the nurse about the condition of the 
syringes. In other words, if a syringe showed evidence of use this would provide 
a legitimate concern that such use was recent. Most importantly, Mohler simply 
did not testify that he provided this vague information to the nurse for purposes of 
diagnosis and treatment. In fact, Mohler stated, in police-officer-speak, that it 
was his desire to give the nurse a basis for "a line of questioning" regarding the 
contents of the pack; this testimony, combined with Mohler's baseless concern 
about weapons, demonstrates that his true intent or motivation was drug 
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interdiction. Mohler's conduct was not consistent with a concern for the proper 
treatment of the patient with the benefit of all relevant information. 
Although Amirkhizi was in the ambulance when Mohler searched the 
backpack, and the backpack had been placed between the front seats, Mohler 
never asked Amirkhizi any questions about what he had found. (T. 13-14) 
Mohler told the nurse to be "cautious" and then sought out a Wyoming trooper 
and a Utah deputy, explaining what he had discovered in rummaging through the 
pack. (T. 6) 
Such was clearly the case here. EMT Mohler works for the county, and his 
duties often put him alongside police officers during and in relation to various 
police investigations. He testified that, as an EMT, he has received training in 
drug awareness and drug recognition from the sheriffs office in Evanston as well 
as from the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigations. The only reason he 
had for unzipping the outer pocket of the backpack was to deposit the keys. By 
that point, Amirkhizi was immobilized, strapped on to the gurney, and could not 
put the keys in the backpack himself. Mohler, out of "curiosity", took it upon 
himself to scrounge around in the backpack, and actually removed the pill 
container from inside of the pack, opened it up, and inspected the contents; he 
could not have been aware of the name on the container before removing it. 
Then Mohler opened yet another compartment of the backpack and inspected 
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additional items. 
EMT Mohler's search of the backpack clearly violated Amirkhizi's 
expectation of privacy. The only purpose for even touching the backpack was to 
do Amirkhizi a favor and deposit the keys. Instead, this gesture turned into a 
warrantless search by a government agent who just happened to have drug 
awareness and drug recognition training. 
In sum, Mohler's conduct constituted state action under the Fourth 
Amendment. He illegally searched Amirkhizi's backpack in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment in the absence of a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, and the district court erred in not suppressing the evidence. 
B. Even if Trooper Davis had probable cause to search the backpack, 
no exception to the warrant requirement permitted him to do a 
warrantless search.3 
If Amirkhizi prevails on the first issue, then the poisonous tree doctrine 
ends the analysis since Trooper Davis' subsequent conduct, the search of the 
backpack and the car, was based entirely on the tainted information provided by 
EMT Mohler. However, even if EMT Mohler did not violate the Fourth 
3
 The district court concluded that a warrantless search was not justified by 
an exception to the warrant requirement. This section is included in the brief in 
the event the state attempts to claim that a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement does apply. 
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Amendment, the evidence should be suppressed because Trooper Davis was 
obligated to obtain a search warrant upon learning from the other officer about 
the contents of the backpack. The search of the backpack was not done incident 
to arrest, since Amirkhizi was not yet under arrest, and Davis did not have 
probable cause to make an arrest at that point. In addition, the search could not 
be done as part of the automobile exception because even if the officer had 
probable cause to search, the item to be searched was the backpack and not the 
vehicle. The backpack, of course, was no longer in the car when EMT Mohler 
scavenged through it, nor was it in Amirkhizi's vehicle when the trooper later 
initiated his "unusual circumstances" search. 
On cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, Trooper Davis testified 
that the "unusual circumstances" of the case permitted him to search the 
backpack without first obtaining a search warrant. (Stipulated Facts f 10, R. 34, 
35) Trooper Davis' opinion, however, does not even remotely reflect any 
accepted view of the Fourth Amendment. 
It is a core principle that "reasonableness" is the touchstone for 
determining the constitutionality of a search. Florida v. Jimeno. 111 S.Ct. 1801, 
1803 (1991). However, "a warrantless search is reasonable only when it falls 
within one of the clearly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." ]a\ 1803. 
"As such, precedent neither establishes nor condones application of an 
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amorphous 'reasonableness' test to determine the constitutionality of a 
warrantless search. United States v. Bute. 43 F.3d 531, 534-35 (10th Cir. 1994). 
""[T]he few situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a 
warrant have been carefully delineated." Arkansas v. Sanders. 442 U.S. 753, 
760 (1979). The state cannot show that the "unusual circumstances" justification 
is a clearly established exception to the warrant requirement, as would be 
required to uphold the search of the backpack by Trooper Davis. 
Even assuming that EMT Mohler did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
when he engaged in state action as a county employee by scrounging around in 
the backpack to satisfy his curiosity, circumstances did not permit Trooper Davis 
to dispense with the warrant requirement. First, as the district court found, Davis 
did not have consent to search the backpack. (R.at 52) After Mohler discovered 
what he believed was contraband in the backpack, he returned the items to the 
backpack and zipped it up. A short time later, Trooper Davis asked Amirkhizi for 
permission to search the backpack. Amirkhizi adamantly refused. (R. at 51) It is 
beyond serious argument that, not withstanding Trooper Davis' view of the law, 
refusal to give consent does not provide probable cause to search. 
Second, even if Trooper Davis had probable cause to search the backpack, 
based on the second-hand information given to him by Officer Chandler, the law 
required issuance of a warrant before a search could take place. The state has 
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the burden of justifying a warrantless search by demonstrating a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement. As the district court properly concluded, no 
exception applies to this case. (R. at 53) Davis merely explained that "unusual 
circumstances" permitted him to search. 
At bottom, well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
intended to limit independent officer discretion. Trooper Davis' non-existent 
"unusual circumstances" test places the law on its head and stands in lonely 
opposition to decades of precedent. 
In sum, probable cause to search, even if present, was not a sufficient 
justification to make a warrantless search of the backpack. Because no 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists in this case to validate 
Trooper Davis' search of the backpack, all evidence discovered and seized 
stemming from the unlawful search must be suppressed. 
C. The trial court erred in ruling that the evidence in the backpack would 
have been inevitably discovered upon Amirkhizi's arrest. 
Even though the district court correctly found that no exception to the 
warrant requirement justified Trooper Davis' search of the backpack, the court 
held that the exclusionary rule did not apply because the evidence would have 
been inevitably discovered. Without providing the applicable standard to the 
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inevitable discovery doctrine, the court justified invocation of the rule as follows: 
Davis had the necessary information to arrest defendant, even 
before looking into the backpack. He had been advised that the 
backpack contained syringes and possibly cocaine. Based on that 
information from the Wyoming officer alone Davis could have lawfully 
arrested defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia and 
possession of a controlled substance. 
* * * * 
The court concludes that the state has proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the evidence here would have been lawfully 
obtained by other means which means were lawful; that is, a lawful 
probable cause arrest followed by a search incident to arrest or 
inventory search. 
(R. at 53) 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule has been described as follows: 
"Court's view the exclusionary rule as a necessary deterrent to unlawful police 
behavior, one which prevents the police from benefitting from their illegalities." 
State v. Topanotes. 76 P.3d 1159,1162 fl 13 (Utah 2003). Yet this rule is not 
meant to put police in a worse position than they would have been had no police 
illegality taken place. ]a\ The inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to 
look to the facts and circumstances surrounding the discovery of the tainted 
evidence and asks whether the police would have discovered the evidence 
despite the illegality." jd^atlf 14. Accordingly, "'If the prosecution can establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably 
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would have been discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale 
has so little basis that the evidence should be received."' ]d (quoting Nix v. 
Williams. 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984). 
While some jurisdictions require an entirely separate and ongoing 
investigation before the inevitable discovery doctrine can be applied, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "an entirely independent, alternate, intervening, 
appreciably attenuated investigation aside from the tainted investigation" is not 
required in order to apply the rule. State v. James. 13 P.3d 576, 580-81 ffll 15-
16. Instead, as stated above, the standard is whether the evidence would have 
been discovered by lawful means. Still, the court in Topanotes emphasized that 
"[a] crucial element of inevitable discovery is independence; there must be some 
'independent basis for discovery'" to use the evidence at trial, 76 P.2d at 1163 fl 
16 (quoting United States v. Boatriqht. 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987). 
Accordingly, "'the fact or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable [must] 
arise from circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'" 
idL (quoting Boatriqht. 822 F.2d at 864-65). 
All of this, of course, requires courts to "confidently . . . predict what would 
have occurred, but did not actually occur." Jd Analysis of an inevitable discovery 
problem, then, can require predictions not simply about how a person might have 
behaved, but how a person would have behaved. In Topanotes the court 
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warned: "Cases that rely upon individual behavior as a crucial link in the 
inevitable discovery chain . . . rarely sustain an inevitable discovery theory." 76 
P.2d at 1164 TI20. This can be speculation about the behavior of the police or 
some other individual that can break the chain of inevitability. 
In the instant case, the district court speculated that, based only on the 
hearsay information received from the Wyoming officer about the contents of the 
backpack, Trooper Davis would have inevitably arrested Amirkhizi for 
paraphernalia drug offenses. This conclusion by the district court, however, has 
more to do with what Davis could have done, or what he might have been legally 
justified in doing. The enquiry, however, is what Trooper Davis would have done. 
And even though this required the court to make a prediction, the prediction had 
to be supported by the record. Yet there was no record evidence supporting the 
court's conclusion that Davis intended to arrest Amirkhizi after he learned from 
the Wyoming officer that the backpack possibly contained contraband. 
The facts show instead that the Davis' focus was on searching the 
backpack, either with or without Amirkhizi's consent. Davis never testified that 
his intention was to arrest Amirkhizi. Indeed, on the witness stand the trooper 
stated that "unusual circumstances" permitted him to forego the process of 
getting a search warrant. Since the inevitable discovery doctrine requires a 
degree of speculation about future conduct and police procedure, it seems utterly 
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certain that Davis must have known that he could search Amirkhizi incident to 
arrest, and thus avoid the absurdity of justifying a search based on the non-
existent "unusual circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. 
There was a reasonable and arguably more likely alternative to a custodial 
arrest of an injured suspect who would soon be on his way to the hospital. 
Indeed, Amirkhizi's identity was no mystery to the investigating officers, and 
permitting him to be taken to the hospital would have had no deleterious effect on 
the investigation. The important thing was to protect the backpack, which Trooper 
Davis could easily have done seizing and placing it in safe-keeping until a search 
warrant could be secured. Another alternative would have been to call a district 
court judge and obtain a telephonic search warrant4 from the location of the 
accident. Thus Trooper Davis had at least three alternative courses of action that 
would have provided the state with the contraband inside the backpack. 
The point is that Davis never stated his intention to arrest Amirkhizi, yet the 
district court simply assumed that a custodial arrest would have occurred prior to 
the search of the backpack.5 Possible alternative courses of action become 
4
 The requirements of a telephonic search warrant are set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §77-23-204. 
5
 The transcript of the preliminary hearing does not indicate whether 
Amirkhizi was in fact placed under arrest at the scene of the accident, after Davis 
searched the backpack, or if the arrest came sometime later, either at the hospital 
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entirely relevant when inevitable discovery depends, as it does here, on individual 
behavior. It becomes even more difficult to predict the future conduct of Trooper 
Davis since his knowledge of Fourth Amendment procedures is, to say the least, 
imperfect. See Topanotes 76 P.2d at 1164 ^ 21 ("While the situation could have 
developed in the manner hypothesized by the State, we are not persuaded that it 
would have led to legal discovery of the evidence in question."); see also State v. 
Robb. 605 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 2000) (inevitable discovery not demonstrated where 
prosecution made an argument that the vehicle could have been impounded and 
inventoried since there was no showing that impoundment was the only 
alternative); State v. Raved, 777 A.2d 301 (N.J. 2001) (forced extraction of blood 
from defendant at hospital over his objection not admissible under inevitable 
discovery rule because no evidence hospital would have taken a blood test 
absent the police request and defendant did not even appear injured); State v. 
Milliorn. 794 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1990) (rejecting inevitable discovery theory 
premised on hypothetical inventory search since no witness for the state testified 
regarding routine inventory procedures for impounded vehicles). 
Finally, the district court simply assumed that Trooper Davis had probable 
cause to arrest Amirkhizi in the first place, aside for the question of whether Davis 
or after Amirkhizi's release from the hospital. 
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intended to make the arrest. Even assuming Davis had probable cause to search 
the backpack, this does not mean that he had probable cause to arrest Amirkhizi 
based only on hearsay information. As Professor LaFave has noted, "there may 
be probable cause to search without probable cause to arrest, and vice-versa." 
W. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(b) 
at 9 (3rd ed. 1996). Professor LaFave continues: 
[P]robable cause to search a particular place may exist without there 
also being probable cause to arrest a person who occupies that 
place. Consequently, a search warrant is not rendered invalid 
because of a lack of grounds to arrest any particular person, nor is 
an arrest made lawful simply because there was probable cause for 
a search of the home of the person arrested. 
id at 9-10. 
The information provided to Trooper Davis could no more justify making an 
arrest under these circumstances than an arrest could be made based on the 
statement of an informant that the informant had just been inside someone's 
house and observed marijuana. See, e.g.. United States v. Connolv. 479 F.2d 
930 (9th Cir. 1973) (man arrested on the street for possession of narcotics told 
police the address of the home where he got the drugs; police were not justified 
in arresting the man and woman who lived at the home). EMT Mohler testified 
that the substance he saw in the backpack was "white powder" and "might have 
been a controlled substance" (T. at 5, 7) Mohler did not field test the substance, 
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he did not ask Amirkhizi any questions about it, and he did not show it to the 
police. (T. 15-16) Moreover, since he did not bother asking Amirkhizi about his 
health, for all Mohler new Amirkhizi could have been a diabetic, thus explaining 
the presence of the syringes. There were simply too many unanswered 
questions to support arresting Amirkhizi. Arguably, Trooper Davis knew this, 
which is why he wanted to search before making an arrest. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Amirkhizi requests this 
Court to reverse the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress. 
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